How to Leak a Secret: Theory and Applications of Ring Signatures

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Abstract. In this work we formalize the notion of a *ring signature*, which makes it possible to specify a set of possible signers without revealing which member actually produced the signature. Unlike group signatures, ring signatures have no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination: any user can choose any set of possible signers that includes himself, and sign any message by using his secret key and the others' public keys, without getting their approval or assistance. Ring signatures provide an elegant way to leak authoritative secrets in an anonymous way, to sign casual email in a way that can only be verified by its intended recipient, and to solve other problems in multiparty computations.
Our main contribution lies in the presentation of efficient constructions of ring signatures; the general concept itself (under different terminology) was first introduced by Cramer et al. [CDS94]. Our constructions of such signatures are unconditionally signer-ambiguous, secure in the random oracle model, and exceptionally efficient: adding each ring member increases the cost of signing or verifying by a single modular multiplication and a single symmetric encryption. We also describe a large number of extensions, modifications and applications of ring signatures which were published after the original version of this work (in Asiacrypt 2001).

1 Introduction

The general notion of a *group signature scheme* was introduced in 1991 by Chaum and van Heyst [CV91]. In such a scheme, a trusted group manager predefines certain groups of users and distributes specially designed keys to their members. Individual members can then use these keys to anonymously sign messages on behalf of their group. The signatures produced by different group members look indistinguishable to their verifiers, but not to the group manager who can revoke the anonymity of misbehaving signers.

In this work we formalize the related notion of *ring signature schemes*. These are simplified group signature schemes that have only users and no managers (we call such signatures "ring signatures" instead of "group signatures" since rings

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are geometric regions with uniform periphery and no center).[3] Group signatures are useful when the members want to cooperate, while ring signatures are useful when the members do not want to cooperate. Both group signatures and ring signatures are *signer-ambiguous*, but in a ring signature scheme there are no prearranged groups of users, there are no procedures for setting, changing, or deleting groups, there is no way to distribute specialized keys, and there is no way to revoke the anonymity of the actual signer (unless he decides to expose himself). Our only assumption is that each member is already associated with the public key of some standard signature scheme such as RSA. To produce a ring signature, the *actual signer* declares an arbitrary set of *possible signers* that must include himself, and computes the signature entirely by himself using only his secret key and the others' public keys. In particular, the other possible signers could have chosen their RSA keys only in order to conduct e-commerce over the internet, and may be completely unaware that their public keys are used by a stranger to produce such a ring signature on a message they have never seen and would not wish to sign.

The notion of ring signatures is not completely new, but previous references do not crisply formalize the notion, and propose constructions that are less efficient and/or that have different, albeit related, objectives. They tend to describe this notion in the context of general group signatures or multiparty constructions, which are quite inefficient. For example, Chaum et al. [CV91]'s schemes three and four, and the two signature schemes in Definitions 2 and 3 of Camenisch's paper [Cam97] can be viewed as ring signature schemes. However the former schemes require zero-knowledge proofs with each signature, and the latter schemes require as many modular exponentiations as there are members in the ring. Cramer et al. [CDS94] show how to produce witness-indistinguishable interactive proofs. Such proofs could be combined with the Fiat-Shamir technique to produce ring signature schemes. Similarly, DeSantis et al. [SCPY94] show that interactive SZK for random self-reducible languages are closed under monotone boolean operations, and show the applicability of this result to the construction of a ring signature scheme (although they don't use this terminology).

The direct construction of ring signatures proposed in this paper is based on a completely different idea, and is exceptionally efficient for large rings (adding only one modular multiplication and one symmetric encryption per ring member both to generate and to verify such signatures). The resultant signatures are unconditionally signer-ambiguous and secure in the random oracle model. This model, formalized in [BR93], assumes that all parties have oracle access to a truly random function.

There have been several followup papers on the theory and applications of ring signatures. We summarize these results in Section 7.

[3] Hanatani and Ohta have pointed out that the idea of signing messages in the form of a ring dates back at least as far as 1756, the middle of Edo period, in Japan [HO05]. In that time, a group of farmers would sign their names in the form of a ring so as to conceal the identity of the group leader. (Had they signed sequentially, the leader would be expected to be the first on the list.)

2 Definitions and Applications

2.1 Ring Signatures

Terminology: We call a set of *possible signers* a *ring*. We call the ring member who produces the actual signature the *signer* and each of the other ring members a *non-signer*.

We assume that each possible signer is associated (via a PKI directory or certificate) with a public key P_k that defines his signature scheme and specifies his verification key. The corresponding secret key (which is used to generate regular signatures) is denoted by S_k. The general notion of a ring signature scheme does not require any special properties of these individual signing schemes, but our simplest construction assumes that they use trapdoor one-way permutations (such as the RSA functions) to generate and verify signatures.

A ring signature scheme is defined by two procedures:

- **ring-sign**$(m, P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_r, s, S_s)$ which produces a ring signature σ for the message m, given the public keys P_1, P_2, $\ldots$, P_r of the r ring members, together with the secret key S_s of the s-th member (who is the actual signer).
- **ring-verify**(m, σ) which accepts a message m and a signature σ (which includes the public keys of all the possible signers), and outputs either *true* or *false*.

A ring signature scheme is *set-up free*: The signer does not need the knowledge, consent, or assistance of the other ring members to put them in the ring; all he needs is knowledge of their regular public keys. Different members can use different independent public key signature schemes, with different key and signature sizes. Verification must satisfy the usual soundness and completeness conditions, but in addition we want the signatures to be *signer-ambiguous* in the sense that a signature should leek no information about the identity of the signer. This anonymity property can be either *computational* or *unconditional*. Our main construction provides unconditional anonymity in the sense that even an infinitely powerful adversary with access to an unbounded number of chosen-message signatures produced by the same ring member cannot guess his identity with any advantage, and cannot link additional signatures to the same signer.

Note that the size of any ring signature must grow linearly with the size of the ring, since it must list the ring members; this is an inherent disadvantage of ring signatures as compared to group signatures that use predefined groups.

2.2 Leaking Secrets

To motivate the title for this paper, suppose that Bob (also known as "Deep Throat") is a member of the cabinet of Lower Kryptonia, and that Bob wishes to leak a juicy fact to a journalist about the escapades of the Prime Minister, in such a way that Bob remains anonymous, yet such that the journalist is convinced that the leak was indeed from a cabinet member.

Bob cannot send to the journalist a standard digitally signed message, since such a message, although it convinces the journalist that it came from a cabinet member, does so by directly revealing Bob's identity.

It also doesn't work for Bob to send the journalist a message through a standard "anonymizer" [Ch81, Ch88, GRS99], since the anonymizer strips off all source identification and authentication: the journalist would have no reason to believe that the message really came from a cabinet member at all.

A standard group signature scheme does not solve the problem, since it requires the prior cooperation of the other group members to set up, and leaves Bob vulnerable to later identification by the group manager, who may be controlled by the Prime Minister.

The correct approach is for Bob to send the story to the journalist (through an anonymizer), signed with a ring signature scheme that names each cabinet member (including himself) as a ring member. The journalist can verify the ring signature on the message, and learn that it definitely came from a cabinet member. He can even post the ring signature in his paper or web page, to prove to his readers that the juicy story came from a reputable source. However, neither he nor his readers can determine the actual source of the leak, and thus the whistleblower has perfect protection even if the journalist is later forced by a judge to reveal his "source" (the signed document).

2.3 Designated Verifier Signature Schemes

A designated verifier signature scheme is a signature scheme in which signatures can only be verified by a single "designated verifier" chosen by the signer. It can be viewed as a "light signature scheme" which can authenticate messages to their intended recipients without having the nonrepudiation property. This concept was first introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo at Eurocrypt 96 [JSI96].

A typical application is to enable users to authenticate casual emails without being legally bound to their contents. For example, two companies may exchange drafts of proposed contracts. They wish to add to each email an authenticator, but not a real signature which can be shown to a third party (immediately or years later) as proof that a particular draft was proposed by the other company.

One approach would be to use zero knowledge interactive proofs, which can only convince their verifiers. However, this requires interaction and is difficult to integrate with standard email systems and anonymizers. We can use non-interactive zero knowledge proofs, but then the authenticators become signatures which can be shown to third parties. Another approach is to agree on a shared secret symmetric key k, and to authenticate each contract draft by appending a message authentication code (MAC) for the draft computed with key k. A third party would have to be shown the secret key to validate a MAC, and even then he wouldn't know which of the two companies computed the MAC. However, this requires an initial set-up procedure to generate the secret symmetric key k.

A designated verifier scheme provides a simple solution to this problem: company A can sign each draft it sends, naming company B as the designated verifier.

This can be easily achieved by using a ring signature scheme with companies A and B as the ring members. Just as with a MAC, company B knows that the message came from company A (since no third party could have produced this ring signature), but company B cannot prove to anyone else that the draft of the contract was signed by company A, since company B could have produced this draft by itself. Unlike the case of MAC's, this scheme uses public key cryptography, and thus A can send unsolicited email to B signed with the ring signature without any preparations, interactions, or secret key exchanges. By using our proposed ring signature scheme, we can turn standard signature schemes into designated verifier schemes, which can be added at almost no cost as an extra option to any email system.

3 Efficiency of Our Ring Signature Scheme

When based on Rabin or RSA signatures, our ring signature scheme is particularly efficient:

- signing requires one modular exponentiation, plus one or two modular multiplications for each non-signer.
- verification requires one or two modular multiplications for each ring member.

In essence, generating or verifying a ring signature costs the same as generating or verifying a regular signature plus an extra multiplication or two for each non-signer, and thus the scheme is truly practical even when the ring contains hundreds of members. It is two to three orders of magnitude faster than Camenisch's scheme, whose claimed efficiency is based on the fact that it is 4 times faster than earlier known schemes (see bottom of page 476 in his paper [Cam97]). In addition, a Camenisch-like scheme uses linear algebra in the exponents, and thus requires all the members to use the same prime modulus p in their individual signature schemes. One of our design criteria is that the signer should be able to assemble an arbitrary ring without any coordination with the other ring members. In reality, if one wants to use other users' public keys, they are much more likely to be RSA keys, and even if they are based on discrete logs, different users are likely to have different moduli p. The only realistic way to arrange a Camenisch-like signature scheme is thus to have a group of consenting parties.

4 The Proposed Ring Signature Scheme (RSA Version)

Suppose that Alice wishes to sign a message m with a ring signature for the ring of r individuals A_1, A_2, ..., A_r, where the signer Alice is A_s, for some value of s, $1 \leq s \leq r$. To simplify the presentation and proof, we first describe a ring signature scheme in which all the ring members use RSA [RSA78] as their individual signature schemes. The same construction can be used for any other trapdoor one way permutation, but we have to modify it slightly in order to use trapdoor one way functions (as in, for example, Rabin's signature scheme [Rab79]).

4.1 RSA Trapdoor Permutations

Each ring member A_i has an RSA public key $P_i = (n_i, e_i)$ which specifies the trapdoor one-way permutation f_i of $\mathbf{Z}_{n_i}$:

$$f_i(x) = x^{e_i} \pmod{n_i} .$$

We assume that only A_i knows how to compute the inverse permutation f_i^{-1} efficiently, using trapdoor information (i.e., $f_i^{-1}(y) = y^{d_i} (\text{mod } n_i)$, where $d_i = e_i^{-1} (\text{mod } \phi(n_i))$ is the trapdoor information). This is the original Diffie-Hellman model [DH76] for public-key cryptography.

Extending trapdoor permutations to a common domain

The trapdoor RSA permutations of the various ring members will have domains of different sizes (even if all the moduli n_i have the same number of bits). This makes it awkward to combine the individual signatures, and thus we extend all the trapdoor permutations to have as their common domain the same set $\{0,1\}^b$, where 2^b is some power of two which is larger than all the moduli n_i's.

For each trapdoor permutation f over $\mathbf{Z}_n$, we define the extended trapdoor permutation g over $\{0,1\}^b$ in the following way. For any b-bit input m define nonnegative integers q and r so that $m = qn + r$ and $0 \leq r < n$. Then

$$g(m) = \begin{cases} qn + f(r) & \text{if } (q+1)n \leq 2^b \\ m & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

Intuitively, g is defined by using f to operate on the low-order digit of the n-ary representation of m, leaving the higher order digits unchanged. The exception is when this might cause a result larger than $2^b - 1$, in which case m is unchanged. If we choose a sufficiently large b (e.g. 160 bits larger than any of the n_i's), the chance that a randomly chosen m is unchanged by the extended g becomes negligible. (A stronger but more expensive approach, which we don't need, would use instead of $g(m)$ the function $g'(m) = g((2^b - 1) - g(m))$ which can modify all its inputs). The function g is clearly a permutation over $\{0,1\}^b$, and it is a one-way trapdoor permutation since only someone who knows how to invert f can invert g efficiently on more than a negligible fraction of the possible inputs.

4.2 Symmetric Encryption

We assume the existence of a publicly defined symmetric encryption algorithm E such that for any key k of length l, the function E_k is a permutation over b-bit strings. Here we use the ideal cipher model which assumes that all the parties have access to an oracle that provides truly random answers to new queries of the form $E_k(x)$ and $E_k^{-1}(y)$, provided only that they are consistent with previous answers and with the requirement that E_k be a permutation. It was shown in [BSS02] that the ideal cipher model can be reduced to the random oracle model

without almost any efficiency loss.[4] For simplicity we use the ideal cipher model in this presentation.

4.3 Hash Functions

We assume the existence of a publicly defined collision-resistant hash function h that maps arbitrary inputs to strings of length l, which are used as keys for E. We model h as a random oracle. (Since h need not be a permutation, different queries may have the same answer, and we do not consider "h^{-1}" queries.)

4.4 Combining Functions

We define a family of keyed "combining functions" $C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r)$ which take as input a key k, an initialization value v, and arbitrary values y_1, y_2, ..., y_r in $\{0,1\}^b$. Each such combining function uses E_k as a sub-procedure, and produces as output a value z in $\{0,1\}^b$ such that given any fixed values for k and v, we have the following properties.

1. **Permutation on each input:** For each $s \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$, and for any fixed values of all the other inputs y_i, $i \neq s$, the function $C_{k,v}$ is a one-to-one mapping from y_s to the output z.
2. **Efficiently solvable for any single input:** For each $s \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$, given a b-bit value z and values for all inputs y_i except y_s, it is possible to efficiently find a b-bit value for y_s such that $C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r) = z$.
3. **Infeasible to solve verification equation without trapdoors:** Given k, v, and z, it is infeasible for an adversary to solve the equation

$$C_{k,v}(g_1(x_1), g_2(x_2), \ldots, g_r(x_r)) = z \tag{1}$$

for x_1, x_2, ..., x_r, (given access to each g_i, and to E_k) if the adversary can't invert any of the trapdoor functions g_1, g_2, ..., g_r.

For example, the function

$$C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r) = y_1 \oplus y_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_r$$

(where $\oplus$ is the exclusive-or operation on b-bit words) satisfies the first two of the above conditions, and can be kept in mind as a candidate combining function. Indeed, it was the first one we tried. But it fails the third condition since for any choice of trapdoor one-way permutations g_i, it is possible to use linear algebra when r is large enough to find a solution for x_1, x_2, ..., x_r without inverting any of the g_i's. The basic idea of the attack is to choose a random value for each x_i, and to compute each $y_i = g_i(x_i)$ in the easy forward direction. If the number of values r exceeds the number of bits b, we can find with high probability a subset

[4] It was shown in [LR88] that the ideal cipher model can *always* be reduced to the random oracle model (with some efficiency loss).

of the y_i bit strings whose XOR is any desired b-bit target z. However, our goal is to represent z as the XOR of all the values $y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r$ rather than as a XOR of a random subset of these values. To overcome this problem, we choose for each i *two* random values x'_i and x''_i, and compute their corresponding $y'_i = g_i(x'_i)$ and $y''_i = g_i(x''_i)$. We then define $y'''_i = y'_i \oplus y''_i$, and modify the target value to $z' = z \oplus y'_1 \oplus y'_2, \ldots \oplus y'_r$. We use the previous algorithm to represent z' as a XOR of a random subset of y'''_i values. After simplification, we get a representation of the original z as the XOR of a set of r values, with exactly one value chosen from each pair (y'_i, y''_i). By choosing the corresponding value of either x'_i or x''_i, we can solve the verification equation without inverting any of the trapdoor one-way permutations g_i. (One approach to countering this attack, which we don't explore further here, is to let b grow with r.)

Even worse problems can be shown to exist in other natural combining functions such as addition mod 2^b. Assume that we use the RSA trapdoor functions $g_i(x_i) = x_i^3 (\text{mod } n_i)$ where all the moduli n_i have the same size b. It is known [HW79] that any nonnegative integer z can be efficiently represented as the sum of exactly nine nonnegative integer cubes $x_1^3 + x_2^3 + \ldots + x_9^3$. If z is a b-bit target value, we can expect each one of the x_i^3 to be slightly shorter than z, and thus their values are not likely to be affected by reducing each x_i^3 modulo the corresponding b-bit n_i. Consequently, we can solve the verification equation $(x_1^3 \bmod n_1) + (x_2^3 \bmod n_2) \ldots + (x_9^3 \bmod n_9) = z (\text{mod } 2^b)$ with nine RSA permutations without inverting any one of them.

Our proposed combining function utilizes the symmetric encryption function E_k as follows:

$$C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r) = E_k(y_r \oplus E_k(y_{r-1} \oplus E_k(y_{r-2} \oplus E_k(\ldots \oplus E_k(y_1 \oplus v)\ldots)))) \ .$$

This function is applied to the sequence $(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r)$, where $y_i = g_i(x_i)$, as shown in Figure 1.



Fig. 1. An illustration of the proposed combining function

This function is clearly a permutation on each input, since the XOR and E_k functions are permutations. In addition, it is efficiently solvable for any single input since knowledge of k makes it possible to run the evaluation forwards from

the initial v and backwards from the final z in order to uniquely compute any missing value y_i.

This function can be used to construct a signature scheme as follows: In order to sign a message m, set $k = h(m)$, where h is some predetermined hash function, and output $x_1, \ldots, x_r$ such that $C_{k,v}(g_1(x_1), g_2(x_2), \ldots, g_r(x_r)) = v$. Notice that forcing the output z to be equal to the input v, bends the line into the ring shape shown in Fig. 2.

A slightly more compact ring signature variant can be obtained by always selecting 0 as the "glue value" v. This variant is also secure, but we prefer the total ring symmetry of our main proposal.



Fig. 2. Ring signatures

4.5 The Ring Signature Scheme

We now formally describe the signature generation and verification procedures:

Generating a ring signature:

Given the message m to be signed, a sequence of public keys P_1, P_2, ..., P_r of all the ring members (each public key P_i specifies a trapdoor permutation g_i), and a secret key S_s (which specifies the trapdoor information needed to compute g_s^{-1}), the signer computes a ring signature as follows.

1. Determine the symmetric key: The signer first computes the symmetric key k as the hash of the message m to be signed:

$$k = h(m)$$

(a more complicated variant computes k as $h(m, P_1, \ldots, P_r)$; however, the simpler construction is also secure.)

2. **Pick a random glue value:** Second, the signer picks an initialization (or "glue") value v uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^b$.
3. **Pick random x_i's:** Third, the signer picks random x_i for all the other ring members $1 \leq i \leq r$, where $i \neq s$, uniformly and independently from $\{0,1\}^b$, and computes
$$y_i = g_i(x_i) \ .$$
4. **Solve for y_s:** Fourth, the signer solves the following ring equation for y_s:
$$C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r) = v \ .$$
By assumption, given arbitrary values for the other inputs, there is a unique value for y_s satisfying the equation, which can be computed efficiently.
5. **Invert the signer's trapdoor permutation:** Fifth, the signer uses his knowledge of his trapdoor in order to invert g_s on y_s, to obtain x_s:
$$x_s = g_s^{-1}(y_s) \ .$$
6. **Output the ring signature:** The signature on the message m is defined to be the $(2r+1)$-tuple:
$$(P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_r; v; x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r) \ .$$

Verifying a ring signature:

A verifier can verify an alleged signature
$$(P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_r; v; x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r) \ .$$
on the message m as follows.

1. **Apply the trapdoor permutations:** First, for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, r$ the verifier computes
$$y_i = g_i(x_i) \ .$$
2. **Obtain k:** Second, the verifier hashes the message to compute the symmetric encryption key k:
$$k = h(m) \ .$$
3. **Verify the ring equation:** Finally, the verifier checks that the y_i's satisfy the fundamental equation:
$$C_{k,v}(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_r) = v \ . \tag{2}$$
If the ring equation (2) is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid. Otherwise the verifier rejects.

4.6 Security

The identity of the signer is unconditionally protected with our ring signature scheme. To see this, note that for each k and v the ring equation has exactly $(2^b)^{(r-1)}$ solutions, and all of them can be chosen by the signature generation procedure with equal probability, regardless of the signer's identity. This argument does not depend on any complexity-theoretic assumptions or on the randomness of the oracle (which determines E_k).

The soundness of the ring signature scheme must be computational, since ring signatures cannot be stronger than the individual signature scheme used by the possible signers.

Theorem 1. *The above ring signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the ideal cipher model (assuming each public key specifies a trapdoor one-way permutation).*

We need to prove that in the ideal cipher model, any forging algorithm A which on input $(P_1, \ldots, P_r)$ can generate with non-negligible probability a new ring signature for m^* by analyzing polynomially many ring signatures for other chosen messages $m \neq m^*$, can be turned into an algorithm B that inverts one of the trapdoor one-way permutations corresponding to $(P_1, \ldots, P_r)$ on a random input, with non-negligible probability.

The basic idea behind the proof is the following: We first show that the ring signing oracle "does not help" A in generating a new signature. This is done by showing that the ring signing oracle can be simulated by an efficient algorithm that has control over the oracles h, E and E^{-1}. We then show that any forgery algorithm (with no ring signing oracle) can be used to invert one of the trapdoor permutations $g_1, \ldots, g_r$ corresponding to the public keys $(P_1, \ldots, P_r)$, on a random input y. This is done by showing how to control the oracles h, E, and E^{-1}, so as to force the "gap" between the output and input values of two cyclically consecutive E_k's along the ring equation of the forgery to be equal to the value y. This forces the forger to close the gap by providing the corresponding $g_i^{-1}(y)$ in the generated signature (for some $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$). Since y is a random value which is not known to the forger, the forger cannot "recognize the trap" and refuse to sign the corresponding messages.

In what follows, we prove Theorem 1 by formalizing the above basic idea.

Proof of Theorem 1: Assume that there exists a forging algorithm A, that succeeds in creating a ring forgery with non-negligible probability. More specifically, algorithm A takes as input a set of random public keys $(P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_r)$ (but not any of the corresponding secret keys), where each P_i specifies a trapdoor one-way permutation g_i. Algorithm A is also given oracle access to h, E, E^{-1}, and to a ring signing oracle. It can work adaptively, querying the oracles at arguments that may depend on previous answers. Eventually, it produces a valid ring signature on a new message that was not presented to the ring signing oracle, with a non-negligible probability (over the random answers of the oracles and its own random coin tosses).

We show that A can be turned into an algorithm B, that takes as input a set of random trapdoor one-way permutations $g_1, \ldots, g_r$ and a random value $y \in \{0,1\}^b$, and outputs with non-negligible probability a value $g_i^{-1}(y)$ for some $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$.

Remark. Note that in order to get a contradiction, we actually need to construct an algorithm B' that takes as input a *single* random trapdoor one-way permutation g and a random element y and outputs with non-negligible probability $g^{-1}(y)$. Such an algorithm B' can be easily constructed from algorithm B as follows. Given a trapdoor one-way permutation g and a random element y, algorithm B' chooses at random an element $j \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$, and random trapdoor permutations $g_1, \ldots, g_r$ such that $g_j \triangleq g$, and runs algorithm B on input $(g_1, \ldots, g_r)$ and y. Algorithm B outputs with non-negligible probability a value of the form $g_i^{-1}(y)$ for some i. Since j is uniformly chosen in $\{1, \ldots, r\}$ and since r is polynomially bounded, it follows that B outputs with non-negligible probability the value $g_j^{-1}(y) = g^{-1}(y)$, as desired. Thus, it suffices to construct algorithm B.

Algorithm B will be constructed in two steps. We first show how to convert the (adaptive) forger A into an (oblivious) forger A' that does not make any queries to the ring signing oracle. We then show how A' can be converted into an inverter algorithm B.

The construction of A′. Algorithm A' uses A as a black-box, while simulating its ring signing oracle, as follows. Every time that A queries its ring signing oracle with a message m, algorithm A' will simulate the response by providing a random vector $(v, x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r)$ as a ring signature of m. It then adjusts the random answers to queries of the form $E_{h(m)}$ and $E_{h(m)}^{-1}$, to support the correctness of the ring equation for these messages. Namely, A' chooses randomly $r-1$ values $z_1, \ldots, z_{r-1}$, lets $z_0 = z_r = v$, and (mentally) sets $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1})) = z_{i+1}$ and $E_{h(m)}^{-1}(z_{i+1}) = z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1})$. Whenever A queries its encryption oracle with query of the form $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1}))$, algorithm A' does not forward this query to the encryption oracle; rather, it pretends that the answer to this query was z_{i+1} and feeds this value as a response to A. Similarly, whenever A queries its decryption oracle with a query of the form $E_{h(m)}^{-1}(z_{i+1})$, algorithm A' does not forward this query to the decryption oracle; rather, it pretends that the answer to this query was $z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1})$. Once A generates an output, A' copies it as its own output.

Lemma 1. *A' succeeds in forging a ring signature with non-negligible probability, assuming that A succeeds in forging a (new) ring signature with non-negligible probability.*

Proof of Lemma 1: We show that the probability that A' succeeds in forging a ring signature is essentially the same as probability in which A succeeds in forging a (new) ring signature. For this it suffices to prove that the view of A

when interacting with its original oracles is (statistically) indistinguishable from the view of A, when interacting with the following modified oracles:

1. The ring signature oracle is modified by replacing it with an oracle that on input any message m outputs a totally random vector $(v, x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r)$.
2. The encryption and decryption oracles are modified by restricting $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1})) = z_{i+1}$ and restricting $E^{-1}_{h(m)}(z_{i+1}) = z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1})$, where m is any message that was signed by the (modified) ring signing oracle, and $(z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_r)$ are the associated random values chosen by A'.

The main thing to realize when arguing the above is that A cannot ask an oracle query of the form $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1}))$ or $E^{-1}_{h(m)}(z_{i+1})$, before providing m to the signing oracle (except with negligible probability). This is so since all the values $z_0 = v$ and $z_1, \ldots, z_{r-1}$ are chosen randomly by A' *after* A sends m as a query to the ring signing oracle, and thus cannot be guessed in advance by A.[5] □

The construction of B. Algorithm B, on input $g_1, \ldots, g_r$ and a random value $y \in \{0,1\}^b$, uses A' on input $(g_1, \ldots, g_r)$ as a black-box (while simulating its oracles), in order to find a value $g_i^{-1}(y)$, for some $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$.

We first note that A' must query the oracle h with the message that it is actually going to forge (otherwise the probability of satisfying the ring equation becomes negligible). Assume that, with non-negligible probability, A' forges the j'th message that it sends to the oracle h. We denote this message by m^*. Algorithm B begins by guessing randomly this index j. Note that B guesses the correct value with non-negligible probability (since A' makes in total at most polynomially many queries to the oracle h).

Recall that A' has access to three oracles: h, E, E^{-1}. Algorithm B simulates the oracle h in the straightforward manner: Whenever A makes a query to h, the query is answered by a uniformly chosen value (unless this query has previously appeared, in which case it is answered the same way as it was before, to ensure consistency).

Whenever A makes a query to E_k or E_k^{-1}, algorithm B first checks whether $k = h(m^*)$ (where m^* is the j'th query that A sends the oracle h). If $k \neq h(m^*)$ (or if A has not yet queried its j'th query to the oracle h), then B simulates these oracles in the straightforward manner. Namely, each query to E_k or E_k^{-1} is answered randomly, unless the value of this query has already been determined

[5] Note that A could have queried its random oracle h with the message m before sending m to the signing oracle, and thus could have queried $E_{h(m)}$ and $E^{-1}_{h(m)}$ with arbitrary messages of its choice. However, since A is polynomially bounded, it sends at most polynomially many queries. Thus, the probability that any one of these queries is of the form $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1}))$ or $E^{-1}_{h(m)}(z_{i+1})$ is negligible. Also, notice that A' never sends queries of the form $E_{h(m)}(z_i \oplus g_{i+1}(x_{i+1}))$ or $E^{-1}_{h(m)}(z_{i+1})$ to his oracles. This follows from the fact that A cannot send oracle queries of this form *before* providing m to the signing oracle (except with negligible probability), and if A sends queries of this form *after* sending m to the ring signing oracle, A' does not forward these queries to his oracles (but rather simulates the answers himself).

by B, in which case it is answered with the predetermined value. Note that so far, the simulated oracles are identically distributed to the real oracles, and thus in particular A' cannot distinguish between the real oracles and the simulated oracles.

It remains to simulate the oracles E_k and E_k^{-1}, for $k = h(m^*)$. Recall that the goal of algorithm B is to compute $x_i = g_i^{-1}(y)$, for some i. The basic idea is to slip this value y as the "gap" between the output and input values of two cyclically consecutive E_k's along the ring equation of the final forgery, which forces A' to close the gap by providing the corresponding x_i in the generated signature. This basic idea is carried out in the following way.

Let $k = h(m^*)$. The forger A' asks various E_k and E_k^{-1} queries, obtaining a disjoint set of pairs $\{(w_i, z_i)\}_{i=1}^t$, where $z_i = E_k(w_i)$. Finally A' presents a forgery of the form $(v; x_1, \ldots, x_r)$. Then with overwhelming probability there exist $\{z_{i_1}, \ldots, z_{i_r}\} \subseteq \{z_i\}_{i=1}^t$ such that the following holds:

1. $v = z_{i_r}$
2. $E_k(z_{i_{j-1}} \oplus g_j(x_j)) = z_{i_j}$ for every $j \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$, where $z_{i_0} \triangleq v$.

Without loss of generality, we may assume that for every $j = 1, \ldots, r$, either w_{i_j} is queried in the "clockwise" E_k direction, or z_{i_j} is queried in the "counterclockwise" E_k^{-1} direction, but not both (because this is redundant). We distinguish between the following three cases:

Case 1: For every $j = 1, \ldots, r$, the value w_{i_j} is queried in the "clockwise" E_k direction.
Case 2: For every $j = 1, \ldots, r$, the value z_{i_j} is queried in the "counterclockwise" E_k^{-1} direction.
Case 3: Some of these queries are in the "clockwise" E_k direction and some are in the "counterclockwise" E_k^{-1} direction.

We next show how in each of these cases, algorithm B can simulate answers to these queries in such a way that the ring signature of m^* generated by A' would yield the value $g_i^{-1}(y)$ for some $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$. We note that with overwhelming probability, E_k and E_k^{-1} are not constrained up to the point where A' queries the oracle h with query m^*. Thus, B will do the following immediately after A' queries the oracle h with query m^*.

Case 1: The structure of the ring implies that there must exist $j \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$ such that w_{i_j} was queried *before* $w_{i_{j-1}}$, where $w_{i_0} \triangleq w_{i_r}$.
Assume that w_{i_j} was queried before $w_{i_{j-1}}$. Then B will guess which query, out of *all* the queries $\{w_i\}$ that are sent to E_k by A', corresponds to w_{i_j} and which query corresponds to $w_{i_{j-1}}$ (there are only polynomially many possibilities and thus he will succeed with non-negligible probability). Next B will provide an answer to $w_{i_{j-1}}$ based on its knowledge of w_{i_j}. More precisely, B will set the output of $E_k(w_{i_{j-1}})$ to be $w_{i_j} \oplus y$ (so that the XOR of the values across the gap is the desired y). All other queries are answered randomly (unless the value of this query has already been determined by B, in which case it is answered with the predetermined value).

Case 2: This case is completely analogous to the previous case, and so B behaves accordingly.

Case 3: The structure of the ring implies that there must exist $j \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$ such that w_{i_j} was queried in the "clockwise" E_k direction whereas the proceeding z_{i_j+1} was queried in the "counterclockwise" E_k^{-1} direction (where $z_{i_{r+1}} \triangleq z_{i_1}$). Assume that w_{i_j} was queried in the "clockwise" E_k direction whereas $z_{i_{j+1}}$ was queried in the "counterclockwise" E_k^{-1} direction.
As in the previous two cases, B will guess which query, out of all the queries $\{w_i\}$ that are sent to E_k by A', corresponds to w_{i_j}, and which query, out of all the queries $\{z_i\}$ that are sent to E_k^{-1} by A', corresponds to $z_{i_{j+1}}$. Next B will answer the query corresponding to $E_k(w_{i_j})$ with a random value z and will answer the query corresponding to $E_k^{-1}(z_{i_{j+1}})$ with $z \oplus y$ (so that the XOR of the values across the gap is the desired y). All other queries are answered randomly (unless the value of this query has already been determined by B, in which case it is answered with the predetermined value).

Note that since y is a random value, the simulated oracles E_k and E_k^{-1} cannot be distinguished from the real oracles, and therefore, with non-negligible probability, A' will output a signature $(v; x_1, \ldots, x_r)$ to a message m^*. Moreover, with non-negligible probability there exists $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$ such that $g_i(x_i) = y$, as desired. □

5 Our Ring Signature Scheme (Rabin Version)

Rabin's public-key cryptosystem [Rab79] has more efficient signature verification than RSA, since verification involves squaring rather than cubing, which reduces the number of modular multiplications from 2 to 1. However, we need to deal with the fact that the Rabin mapping $f_i(x_i) = x_i^2 \pmod{n_i}$ is not a permutation over $\mathbf{Z}_{n_i}^*$, and thus only one quarter of the messages can be signed, and those which can be signed have multiple signatures.

We note that Rabin's function, $f_N(x) = x^2 (\text{mod } N)$, is actually a permutation over $\{x : x < \frac{N}{2} \ \wedge \ (\frac{x}{N}) = 1\}$, assuming N is a Blum integer. Moreover, it can be easily extended to be a permutation over $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ([G04, Section C.1]). However this permutation is no longer so efficient, since in order to compute it on a value x, one first needs to compute $(\frac{x}{N})$, which is a relatively expensive computation. Moreover, both in the signing and verifying procedures, the number of times that a Jacobi symbol needs to be computed grows linearly with the size of the ring.

Rather than trying to convert Rabin's function to a permutation, we suggest the following natural operational fix: when signing, change your last random choice of x_{s-1} if $g_s^{-1}(y_s)$ is undefined. Since only one trapdoor one-way function has to be inverted, the signer should expect on average to try four times before succeeding in producing a ring signature. The complexity of this search is essentially the same as in the case of regular Rabin signatures, regardless of the size of the ring.

A more important difference is in the proof of unconditional anonymity, which relied on the fact that all the mappings were permutations. When the g_i's are not permutations, there can be noticeable differences between the distribution of the x_i's that are randomly chosen, and the distribution of x_s that is actually computed in a given ring signature. This could lead to the identification of the real signer among all the possible signers, and can be demonstrated to be a real problem in many concrete types of trapdoor one-way functions.

Consider, for example, a trapdoor one-way function family $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ such that every $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ is a function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, with the property that every y in the image of f has many pre-images, one which is of the form $x = x_1 \ldots x_n$ such that $x_1 = \ldots, x_{\log n} = 0$. Moreover, assume that the trapdoor information always finds this particular pre-image. In this case it will be easy to distinguish the real signer from the non-signers, as the x_s associated with the real signer will have the $\log n$ most significant bits equal to 0, whereas the x_i's associated with non-signers will be randomly chosen.

We overcome this difficulty in the case of Rabin signatures with the following simple observation:

Observation: Let S be a given finite set of "marbles" and let B_1, B_2, ..., B_n be disjoint subsets of S (called "buckets") such that all non-empty buckets have the same number of marbles, and every marble in S is in exactly one bucket. Consider the following sampling procedure: pick a bucket at random until you find a non-empty bucket, and then pick a marble at random from that bucket. Then this procedure picks marbles from S with uniform probability distribution.

Rabin's functions $f_i(x_i) = x_i^2 \pmod{n_i}$ are extended to functions $g_i(x_i)$ over $\{0,1\}^b$ in the usual way. Let the set B_s of marbles be all the b-bit numbers $u = qn_s + r$ in which $r \in \mathbf{Z}_{n_s}^*$ and $(q+1)n_s \leq 2^b$. Each marble is placed in the bucket to which it is mapped by the extended Rabin mapping g_s. In the Rabin ring signature algorithm, each x_i that corresponds to a non-signer is chosen randomly in $\{0,1\}^b$, whereas x_s that corresponds to the signer is chosen by first choosing a random non-empty bucket and then choosing a random marble from that bucket. The fact that each bucket contains either zero or four marbles, together with the above observation, implies that x_s is uniformly distributed in B_s. The fact that the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^b$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over B_s implies that the distribution of x_i's that correspond to non-signers is statistically close to the distribution of x_s that corresponds to the real signer. Consequently, even an infinitely powerful adversary cannot distinguish between signers and non-signers by analyzing actual ring signatures produced by one of the possible signers.

6 Generalizations and Special Cases

The notion of ring signatures has many interesting extensions and special cases. In particular, ring signatures with $r = 1$ can be viewed as a randomized version of Rabin's signature scheme (or RSA's signature scheme): As shown in Fig. 3,

the verification condition can be written as $(x^2 \bmod n) = v \oplus E^{-1}_{h(m)}(v)$. The right hand side is essentially a hash of the message m, randomized by the choice of v.

Ring signatures with $r = 2$ have the ring equation:

$$E_{h(m)}(x_2^2 \oplus E_{h(m)}(x_1^2 \oplus v)) = v$$

(see Fig. 3). A simpler ring equation (which is not equivalent but has the same security properties) is:

$$(x_1^2 \bmod n_1) = E_{h(m)}(x_2^2 \bmod n_2)$$

where the modular squares are extended to $\{0,1\}^b$ in the usual way. This is our recommended method for implementing designated verifier signatures in email systems, where n_1 is the public key of the sender and n_2 is the public key of the recipient.



Fig. 3. Rabin-based Ring Signatures with $r = 1, 2$

In regular ring signatures it is impossible for an adversary to expose the signer's identity. However, there may be cases in which the signer himself wants to have the option of later proving his authorship of the anonymized email (e.g., if he is successful in toppling the disgraced Prime Minister). Yet another possibility is that the signer A wants to initially use {A,B,C} as the list of possible signers, but later prove that C is *not* the real signer. There is a simple way to implement these options, by choosing the x_i values for the non-signers in a pseudorandom rather than truly random way. To show that C is *not* the author, A publishes the seed which pseudorandomly generated the part of the signature associated with C. To prove that A *is* the signer, A can reveal a single seed which was used to generate all the non-signers' parts of the signature. The signer A cannot misuse this technique to prove that he is not the signer since his

x_i is computed by applying g^{-1} to a random value given to him by the oracle (where g is the trapdoor one-way permutation corresponding to his public key). Thus, his x_i is extremely unlikely to have a corresponding seed. Note that these modified versions can guarantee only computational anonymity, since a powerful adversary can search for such proofs of non-authorship and use them to expose the signer.

A different approach that guarantees unbounded anonymity is to choose the x_i value for each non-signer by choosing a random w_i and letting $x_i = f(w_i)$, where f is a one-way function with the additional property that each element in the range has a pre-image under f. By demonstrating w_i, the signer proves that the i'th ring member is not the signer. Notice that the fact that the signer (which corresponds to the s'th ring member) is computationally bounded, implies that he cannot produce $f^{-1}(x_s)$, and therefore he cannot prove that he himself is not the signer. Moreover, an adversary with unlimited computational power cannot figure out who the signer is since any x_i (including x_s) has a pre-image under f.

7 Followup Work

In this section we summarize the followup papers on the theory and applications of ring signatures.

Deniable Ring Signature Schemes. In [Na02] Naor defined the notion of *Deniable Ring Authentication*. This notion allows a member of an ad hoc subset of participants (a ring) to convince a verifier that a message m is authenticated by one of the members of the subset without revealing by which one, and the verifier cannot convince a third party that message m was indeed authenticated. Naor also provided an efficient protocol for deniable ring authentication based on any secure encryption scheme. The scheme is interactive. Susilo and Mu [SM03, SM04] constructed *non interactive* deniable ring authentication protocols. They first showed in [SM03] how to use any ring signature scheme and a chameleon hash family to construct a deniable ring signature scheme. In this construction the verifier is assumed to be associated with a pair of secret and public keys (corresponding to the chameleon hash family). They then showed in [SM04] how to use any ring signature scheme and an ID based chameleon hash family [AM04] to construct a deniable ring signature scheme. In this construction the verifier is only assumed to have his ID published.

Threshold and General Access Ring Signature Schemes. A t-threshold ring signature scheme is a ring signature scheme where each ring signature is a proof that at least t members of the ring are confirming the message. In a general access ring signature scheme, members of a set can freely choose any family of sets including their own set, and prove that all members of some set in the access structure have cooperated to compute the signature, without revealing any information about which set it is.

There have been many papers which considered these scenarios. The early work of [CDS94] has already considered this scenario, and showed (using different terminology) that a witness indistinguishable proof (with witnesses that correspond to some monotone access structure), can be combined with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, to obtain a monotone access ring signature scheme. The work of Naor [Na02] also contains a construction of a general access (and in particular threshold) ring signature scheme. His scheme is interactive and its security is based only the existence of secure encryption schemes. There have been subsequent works which consider the general access scenario, such as [HS04a].

The work of Bresson et. al. [BSS02] contains a construction of a threshold ring signature scheme (proven secure in the Random Oracle Model under the RSA Assumption). Subsequent works which consider the threshold setting are [Wei04, KT03, WFLW03] (where security is proved in the Random Oracle Model).

Identity-based Ring Signature Schemes. Shamir introduced in 1984 the concept of Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography [Sha84]. The idea is that the public-key of a user can be publicly computed from his identity (for example, from a complete name, an email or an IP address). ID-based schemes avoid the necessity of certificates to authenticate public keys in a digital communication system. This is especially desirable in applications which involve a large number of public keys in each execution, such as ring signatures.

The first to construct an ID-based ring signature scheme were Zhang and Kim [ZK02]. Its security was analyzed in [Her03], based on bilinear pairings in the Random Oracle Model. Subsequent constructions of ID-based ring signatures appear in [HS04b, LW03a, AL03, TLW03, CYH04].

Identity-based Threshold Ring Signature Schemes. ID-based threshold ring signature schemes proven secure in the Random Oracle Model, under the bilinear pairings were constructed in [CHY04, HS04c]. This was extended in [HS04c], to a general access setting, where any subset of users S can cooperate to compute an anonymous signature on a message, on behalf of any family of users that includes S.

Separable Ring Signature Schemes. A ring signature scheme is said to be separable if all participants can choose their keys independently with different parameter domains and for different types of signature schemes. Abe et. al. [AOS02] were the first to address the problem of constructing a separable ring signature scheme. They show how to construct a ring signature scheme from a mixture of both trapdoor-type signature schemes (such as RSA based) and three-move-type signature schemes (such as Discrete Log based). This was extended in [LWW03] to the threshold setting.

Linkable Ring Signature Schemes. The notion of linkable ring signatures, introduced by Liu et al. [LWW04], allows anyone to determine if two ring signatures are signed by the same group member. In [LWW04] they also presented a linkable ring signature scheme that can be extended to the threshold setting.

Their construction was improved in [TWC+04], who presented a separable linkable threshold ring signature scheme.

Verifiable Ring Signature Schemes. Lv and Wang [LW03b] formalized the notion of verifiable ring signatures, which has the following additional property: if the actual signer is willing to prove to a recipient that he signed the signature, then the recipient can correctly determine whether this is the fact. We note that this additional property was considered in our (original) work, and as was mentioned in Section 6, we showed that this property can be obtained by choosing the x_i values for the non-signers in a pseudorandom rather than a truly random way.

Accountable Ring Signaure Schemes. An accountable ring signature scheme, a notion introduces by Xu and Yung [XY04], ensures the following: anyone can verify that the signature is generated by a user belonging to a set of possible signers (that may be chosen on-the-fly), whereas the actual signer can nevertheless be identified by a designated trusted entity. Xu and Yung [XY04] also presented a framework for constructing accountable ring signatures. The framework is based on a compiler that transforms a traditional ring signature scheme into an accountable one.

Short Ring Signature Schemes. Dodis et. al. [DKNS04] were the first to construct a ring signature scheme in which the length of an "actual signature" is independent of the size of the ad hoc group (where an "actual signature" does not include the group description). We note that in all other constructions that we are aware of, the size of an "actual signature" is at least linear in the size of the group. Their scheme was proven secure in the Random Oracle Model assuming the existence of accumulators with one-way domain (which in turn can be based on the Strong RSA Assumption).

Ring Authenticated Encryption. An authenticated encryption scheme allows the verifier to recover and verify the message simultaneously. Lv et al. [LRCK04] introduced a new type of authenticated encryption, called ring authenticated encryption, which loosely speaking, is an authenticated encryption scheme where the verifiability property holds with respect to a ring signature scheme.

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